Reference for Claude · Prediction Markets

Kalshi — A Complete Reference for Building Trading Models

A teaching reference written to be loaded as context for Claude (e.g., in Claude for Excel), so it understands Kalshi's mechanics, uses the exact terms of art, and never invents rules. Every fact is sourced to Kalshi's own Help Center, Fee Schedule, or API docs.

CFTC-regulated DCM $1 binary contracts 1¢–99¢ pricing Fees eff. Feb 5 2026 Compiled Jun 2026
Source-of-truth note Fees, APY, and specs change. Numbers are current as of the cited dates — verify live at kalshi.com/fee-schedule and the market's rules page before trading. Not financial advice.

0The one-paragraph mental model

Kalshi is a U.S. federally regulated exchange where you buy and sell event contracts — binary contracts that pay $1.00 if a specified event happens (resolves Yes) and $0.00 if not (resolves No). Every contract trades between 1¢ and 99¢, and that price is the market's estimate of the event's probability, in cents. Because a contract is worth exactly $1 at settlement, Yes price + No price always equals 100¢. You trade against other members (not the house) on a central limit order book; Kalshi earns transaction fees, not outcomes. Your job as a modeler: estimate the true probability, compare it to the market price net of fees, and trade when your estimate diverges enough to overcome fees and risk.

1What Kalshi is and how it's regulated

1.1 What is Kalshi?

The first regulated exchange for event contracts — instruments whose value comes from whether a real-world event happens, not from owning a company (stocks) or a commodity. Every contract is one binary decision: Yes (it happens) or No (it doesn't).

1.2 What is a prediction market?

A marketplace where contract prices are the crowd's probability estimate, and each contract pays $1 if you're right. A stock exchange trades shares of ownership; a prediction market trades contracts on whether specific events happen — e.g., "Will interest rates rise next quarter?" (Price mechanics in §3.)

1.3 Regulatory status

Kalshi is a Designated Contract Market (DCM) regulated by the CFTC (the U.S. derivatives regulator since 1974), authorized to list futures, swaps, and options. Rulebook: kalshi.com/regulatory/rulebook. Full regulatory detail in §13.

1.4 Kalshi Klear (the clearinghouse)

Kalshi Klear LLC is Kalshi's CFTC-approved clearinghouse (it replaced MIAXdx). In-house clearing enables more market categories, faster listings on breaking news, faster settlement, and APY on idle cash (advertised 3.25%, variable).

1.5 How Kalshi makes money

A neutral exchange — Kalshi holds no position on outcomes. Revenue is a transaction fee on each contract's expected earnings (§6). No settlement fee, no membership fee.

Sources: What is Kalshi? · What are prediction markets? · How is Kalshi regulated? · What is Kalshi Klear? · How does Kalshi make money?

2The core invariants (rules that never change)

These are the load-bearing facts. A correct model must encode all of them.

#InvariantWhy it matters
I1A contract settles to exactly $1.00 (Yes) or $0.00 (No).Payoff is binary; EV = P(true) × $1 − cost.
I2Prices range 1¢ to 99¢ while trading.Price is a bounded probability proxy ∈ [0.01, 0.99].
I3Yes price + No price = 100¢ always.Derive one side from the other; arbitrage if it breaks.
I4Buying Yes ≡ Selling No (same backend action).One position concept; don't double-count.
I5You trade against other members, not Kalshi.Liquidity is finite & crowd-sourced; depth matters.
I6Markets resolve from a pre-defined outcome verification source.Ground truth = the source agency, not the live feed or your judgment.
I7Exception to I1 — scalar settlement: some positions settle between $0 and $1.EV math must allow fractional settlement (scalar / DNP).

Sources: How are prices determined? · Buying Yes vs Selling No · Who are you trading with? · Combos

3How prices work (price = probability)

Kalshi uses a dynamic pricing model: the contract price tracks the market's perceived probability, 0%→100%. As perceived likelihood of Yes rises, the Yes price rises and No falls — always summing to $1.

Worked example (Kalshi's own). A 70% chance of a product launch → Yes = 70¢, No = 30¢. Kalshi matches a Yes buyer with a No buyer; their combined stake (70¢ + 30¢) = $1.00, which pays whoever is right.
P(Yes) = 70% P(No) = 30% Yes 70¢ No 30¢ 50¢ 100¢
Price is probability, and the two sides always sum to 100¢. A 70¢ Yes contract encodes a 70% market-implied chance; No is the 30¢ remainder. Move the split point and both prices move in lockstep.
Modeling — price ↔ probability
  • Implied P(Yes) = Yes price ÷ 100 (70¢ → 0.70).
  • Implied P(No) = No price ÷ 100 = 1 − P(Yes).
  • These are risk-neutral, fee-inclusive market probabilities — not unbiased truth. They embed spread, fees, and crowd bias. Your model produces an independent estimate ; the signal is the gap between and the market-implied probability.

Source: How are prices determined?

4Market structure & terminology (the data model)

Kalshi organizes markets in a strict hierarchy. Knowing it is essential for spreadsheet layout (a tab per series, rows per event/market, columns per field).

Category (e.g., Sports, Crypto, Weather, Economics, Politics) └─ Subcategory (narrower; in the API often expressed as tags) └─ Series (recurring TEMPLATE: same format/rules over time, │ e.g., "Daily High Temp in NYC" = ticker KXHIGHNY) └─ Event (one instance in time; the unit members interact with, │ e.g., KXHIGHNY-24JAN01 — a collection of markets) └─ Market (a single BINARY contract / strike, e.g., KXHIGHNY-24JAN01-T60 = "high ≥ 60°F")
Category e.g. Weather a discovery grouping Series (recurring template) KXHIGHNY Event (one instance · what you trade) KXHIGHNY-24JAN01 Market (one binary contract · a strike) KXHIGHNY-24JAN01-T60 “≥ 60°F” pays $1 / $0
Series → Event → Market. A Series is a recurring template; an Event is one instance (the unit you interact with); a Market is a single binary strike. Don't parse tickers to infer this — use the series_ticker/event_ticker fields. (Categories & subcategory tags sit above, for discovery.)
  • Category — high-level grouping for related series; a series belongs to one.
  • Subcategory — narrower grouping; a series can belong to several; tags in API filters.
  • Series — a recurring template defining structure, settlement sources, metadata. Events in a series look at similar data over disjoint time periods with no outcome dependency between them, and share a ticker prefix.
  • Event — "a collection of markets and the basic unit that members should interact with."
  • Market — "a single binary market," often a single strike. Type is binary or scalar.
Don't parse tickers Tickers usually follow Series → Event → Market (KXHIGHNY → KXHIGHNY-24JAN01 → KXHIGHNY-24JAN01-T60), but there are exceptions. Do not parse ticker strings to infer relationships — use the fields series_ticker, event_ticker, category, tags. On the site, tickers appear in the "Timeline and Payout" dropdown.

4.1 Strikes

Within an event, markets are often strikes — thresholds of an underlying quantity (temp ≥ 60/62/64°F; "S&P closes above X"). The rules summary is filterable by strike; you can request additional strikes.

4.2 Mutually exclusive vs. directional groups

  • Mutually exclusive group — exactly one market can resolve Yes (e.g., "Who will be confirmed?"). Terminal states: exactly one Yes, or all No.
  • Directional (nested threshold) group — logically ordered: a harder threshold being Yes implies easier ones are Yes (e.g., ">3M check-ins" Yes ⇒ ">2M" Yes).

Both shapes enable collateral return (§8).

4.3 Key per-market fields (spreadsheet columns)

From the API Market schema: ticker, event_ticker, market_type, yes_sub_title/no_sub_title, open_time, close_time, status, yes_bid_dollars, yes_ask_dollars, no_bid_dollars, no_ask_dollars, last_price_dollars, volume_fp, volume_24h_fp, liquidity_dollars, open_interest_fp, result, rules_primary, rules_secondary.

Modeling — field glossary
  • last_price — price of most recent trade (noisy consensus point).
  • volume / volume_24h — contracts traded; interest & liquidity signal.
  • open_interest — outstanding open contracts; rising OI + rising price = conviction.
  • liquidity_dollars — dollar depth on the book; how much you can trade without heavy slippage.
  • _fp = fixed-point contract-count strings (fractional trading); _dollars = dollar-denominated. Parse as decimals.

Sources: API Glossary · Get Markets (API) · Rules Summary · Collateral Return · Finding Markets

5The order book, order types, and execution

5.1 The order book

The order book shows all resting orders (offers not matched immediately) with quantity and price. Bid = max a buyer will pay; Ask/offer = min a seller will accept. Kalshi's example: 5,010 to buy Yes at $0.74 and 75,000 to sell Yes at $0.71; viewed as No: 75,000 to buy No at $0.29 and 5,010 to sell No at $0.26.

Modeling — the reciprocal book (critical) Because Yes + No = 100¢, a No bid at q¢ is exactly a Yes ask at (100 − q)¢. Kalshi's public orderbook API returns only bids; the Yes ask side is reconstructed as the complement of the No bid side. If you ingest raw orderbook data, synthesize ask_yes = 100 − bid_no or your model will think markets are one-sided.
YES book NO book ask 74¢ 5,010 contracts bid 26¢ 5,010 contracts 74 + 26 = 100¢ bid 71¢ 75,000 contracts ask 29¢ 75,000 contracts 71 + 29 = 100¢
A No bid is a Yes ask — mirrored across 100¢. The same 5,010 contracts appear as "Yes ask 74¢" and "No bid 26¢"; quantities match across the mirror. The API returns only bids, so reconstruct the Yes ask as 100 − No bid.

5.2 Maker vs. taker

Every trade is between a maker (posts resting order, provides liquidity) and a taker (matches existing order, removes liquidity). Three archetypes: directional traders (price vs. true probability), hedgers (offset external risk; often pay a premium), market makers (earn the spread; opinion-neutral). Most participants today are retail directional traders and hedgers.

Maker posts limit order Order book resting orders Taker sends market order match → fill · maker provides liquidity, taker removes it
Every trade is a maker meeting a taker. The maker rests an order on the book (usually fee-free); the taker crosses the spread to match it immediately (pays the taker fee). Same trade, two roles, two fee outcomes.

5.3 Order types

TypeWhat it doesFee / slippage
Quick order (market order)Immediate fill at best available price; large orders walk the book and pay the average fill price.Always a taker → pays fees; slippage risk on size.
Limit orderSpecify max price (or min to sell). Fills at your price or better; remainder rests. No fill guarantee.If it rests & is filled, you're a maker → typically fee-free (unless market has maker fees).

Quick-order example: 500 Yes at 10¢ and more at 12¢; a 1,000 order buys 500 @ 10¢ + 500 @ 12¢ = 11¢ average (panel shows the blend).

Resting asks (Yes) 12¢500+ available 10¢500 · best price walk Quick order: 1,000 500@10¢ + 500@12¢ = 11¢ avg
A quick (market) order walks the book. If only 500 sit at the best 10¢, the next 500 fill at 12¢ — your blended cost is 11¢, not 10¢. Model slippage from book depth, never from top-of-book alone.
Modeling — execution
  • Limit orders avoid taker fees and give price precision — discount expected edge by fill probability.
  • Quick orders: model slippage by simulating a walk down book depth, not top-of-book.
  • The spread (ask − bid) is a round-trip cost for takers, profit for makers. Wide spread = illiquid = higher implicit cost.

5.4 Flip selling

Flip selling lets you sell more than you hold by closing your position and opening the opposite side at once (hold 5 No, sell 10 → sells 5 No and buys 5 Yes). A settings toggle; useful for fast reversals.

5.5 Block trades (institutional)

A block trade is a large privately-negotiated trade. Both parties must be Eligible Contract Participants (ECPs); current minimum 25,000 contracts (no aggregation); "fair and reasonable" price; reported within 15 minutes; published separately.

5.6 Trading hours

Kalshi trades 24/7, except maintenance Thursdays 3:00–5:00 AM ET (~22h Thursdays).

Sources: The Orderbook · Quick Start: Market Data (API) · Who are you trading with? · Quick Orders · Limit Orders · Flip Selling · Block trades · Trading hours

6Fees (the exact math)

Kalshi charges a trading fee only on orders immediately matched (takers). Resting orders filled later are not charged the standard fee — unless the market is flagged for maker fees.

6.1 General trading-fee formula

fee = roundup( 0.07 × C × P × (1 − P) )

  P = price of the contract in DOLLARS (50¢ → 0.50)
  C = number of contracts
  roundup = round up to the next whole cent

Logic: the fee is 7% of the contract's expected earnings, where expected earnings = $1 × P × (1−P) per contract.

6.2 Maker-fee formula (maker-flagged markets only)

maker fee = roundup( 0.0175 × C × P × (1 − P) )

Charged only when the resting order executes; canceling is always free. Rounding over-payments above $10/month are reimbursed the next month.

6.3 Discounted tier — S&P 500 (INX) & Nasdaq-100 (NASDAQ100)

fee = roundup( 0.035 × C × P × (1 − P) )    # 3.5%, half the general rate

Applies to tickers beginning INX (INXD/W/M/Y/U…) or NASDAQ100 (NASDAQ100D/W/M/Y/U…).

6.4 The fee curve (general 7% tier)

PriceFee / 1 contractFee / 100 contracts
1¢ / 99¢$0.01$0.07
10¢ / 90¢$0.01$0.63
25¢ / 75¢$0.02$1.32
35¢ / 65¢$0.02$1.60
50¢$0.02$1.75 (max)
≈ 1.75¢ at 50¢ (max) maker ≈ 0.44¢ 50¢ 99¢ contract price P fee per contract general (7%) maker (1.75%)
Fee ∝ P × (1 − P) — a hump that peaks at 50¢. The fee is largest on coin-flip markets and smallest near 1¢/99¢, so the edge you need to break even is highest at 50¢. Routing as a maker (limit order) shrinks the whole curve ~4×.
Modeling — the most important consequence Fee ∝ P × (1 − P), a parabola maximized at P = 0.50, shrinking toward the extremes. Therefore: the breakeven edge you need is largest on coin-flip (~50¢) markets and smallest on lopsided (near 1¢/99¢) markets. Per-contract general fee tops out at ~1.75¢ at 50¢; ~0.63¢ near 90¢/10¢; the 1¢ floor near 99¢/1¢. The maker route (limit order; fee-free or 0.0175 tier) materially changes which edges are profitable — a maker at 50¢ pays ≤ 0.44¢ vs a taker's 1.75¢.

6.5 Non-trading fees

  • Settlement / membership: none.
  • ACH deposit/withdrawal: free. Wire: Kalshi adds none (bank fees vary; wire withdrawals only ≥ $500,000).
  • Debit card deposit: up to 2%. Crypto: third-party processor fees, disclosed first.

Sources: Fees · Kalshi Fee Schedule PDF (eff. Feb 5, 2026)

7Settlement, expiration & outcome determination

7.1 Timeline & payout

Each market's "Timeline and Payout" shows opened / closes / expected payout. Two closure types: closure when the outcome occurs (event-driven) and closure at a listed date/time (time-driven). Always check which applies.

7.2 How outcomes are determined

The rules, the data used, and its source are in each contract's terms. After expiration, Kalshi determines the outcome from rules + source data. Determination typically takes ~1 to >12 hours, governed by when the source agency publishes.

7.3 "Settled" & timing

A market settles when the official outcome is confirmed and finalized; winners pay out to cash. Most settle within a few hours (~3h). Keep distinct: close time (trading stops) vs determination time (official result confirmed). A market remaining open is not a signal about resolution — Kalshi often waits for the source agency.

Open trading starts Close trading stops Determination source confirms Settled payout → cash ~1–12h · a market staying open ≠ undecided
Close time ≠ determination time. Trading can stop before the official result is confirmed by the source agency. Settlement (payout to cash) usually lands a few hours after determination.

7.4 Reading market rules (do this first)

  • Rules summary — value measured, timeline, verification source; filterable by strike. It's a summary; full rules under "View full rules."
  • Additional details — clarifications the markets team may add (not obligated to).
Modeling — settlement-source risk The biggest non-price risk is resolution ambiguity / source risk: which agency, timestamp, definition. Two look-alike markets can resolve differently due to wording. Pin the exact source and definition into your model's assumptions, and treat edge near ambiguous rules with extra caution.

Sources: Timeline and Payout · Market Outcomes · Market FAQs · Market Rules · Additional Details

8Collateral return (capital efficiency for hedged baskets)

Collateral return (API flag netting_enabled) returns cash early when you hold hedged positions in mutually-exclusive or directional groups, lowering capital-at-risk. Off by default. Trade-off: once collateral is returned, you may be unable to sell that position before settlement. Lock-in quirk: the flag is set at your first order in an event (even an unfilled one) and is then locked for that event.

Mutually exclusive (Kalshi's example). "Who will be confirmed Secretary of State?" Buy No-Clinton 60¢ + No-Kerry 70¢ → invested $1.30, but ≥1 pays $1. Max loss = $1.30 − $1.00 = $0.30. Kalshi takes only $0.30 collateral and marks position value down by the returned $1.
Directional (Kalshi's example). TSA check-ins. Buy Yes ">1,000,000" 80¢ + No ">3,000,000" 70¢ → invested $1.50, ≥1 pays $1 → max loss $0.50; Kalshi takes only $0.50.
$1.30 Without netting $1.30 tied up returned $1.00 at risk $0.30 With collateral return only $0.30 at risk
Hedged baskets tie up less cash. Buying No-Clinton (60¢) + No-Kerry (70¢) costs $1.30, but at least one pays $1, so max loss is $0.30. Collateral return frees the other $1.00 — shrinking the denominator in ROI-per-dollar.
Modeling — why it matters Return-on-capital, not just EV, ranks strategies. Collateral return can dramatically raise ROI per dollar deployed on hedged/arb baskets by shrinking capital tied up. Model both EV and capital-at-risk; with netting on, capital-at-risk = the basket's max loss, not gross premium.

Source: Collateral Return

9Combos (multi-leg parlays)

A combo trades a custom combination of events as one position with its own order book. It resolves to the PRODUCT of its legs and pays a max of $1.00/contract.

  • Pricing via RFQ (Request For Quote): you request, others quote live. Quotes can lag and change before execution; fills not guaranteed. Once filled, all combo trades are final.
  • Settlement: after all legs resolve (typically 1–12h after the last). All legs $1 → $1; any leg $0 → whole combo $0.
  • Scalar / DNP legs: a partial leg (e.g., DNP → $0.70) is not refunded — payout = product including the partial: $0.70 × $1 × $1 = $0.70. A blue arrow flags a scalar settlement.
$1.00 × $1.00 × $0.70 = $0.70 a scalar / DNP leg (0.70) is not refunded — it just multiplies in $1.00 × $0.00 × $1.00 = $0.00 any single leg at $0 zeroes the whole combo
A combo pays the product of its legs (max $1). All legs at $1 → $1; one leg at $0 → the entire parlay is $0. Because legs in the same game are often correlated, the naïve product usually overstates an "all-happen" parlay.
Modeling — combo math For independent legs, fair combo value ≈ ∏ pᵢ. Combos compound edge and error: four 90¢ legs ≈ 0.9⁴ ≈ 0.656. Real legs (same game) are usually correlated, so the independence product typically overstates "all-happen" parlays — model correlation or haircut the product.

Sources: Combos · Market FAQs

10Portfolio, cash & account data

  • Portfolio = cash + market value of open positions + resting orders. Shows # contracts, average purchase price (cost basis), current value (what you'd get selling now, liquidity-permitting), and total payout if it resolves your way. Value fluctuates with prices even when idle. May be unable to "cash out" if no buyer at your price.
  • Cash = unallocated, withdrawable funds. Deposits land here; withdrawals require cash.
  • Trading history / documents = cumulative P&L statements for performance tracking.
  • APY — idle balances can earn interest (Klear: ~3.25%, variable, eligibility).
Modeling — "current value" ≠ "mark-to-mid" Displayed current value reflects what you'd actually receive given available liquidity, not a theoretical mid. Decide explicitly whether to mark positions to last price, mid (bid+ask)/2, or liquidation value — they diverge in thin markets.

Sources: Portfolio · Cash · Trading History · Kalshi Klear

11Data & graph tools (model inputs)

  • Price graph — historical traded price (the probability path).
  • Forecast graph — visualization of traders' current expectation of where the market expires (e.g., ~6.8 inches of snow). Not real-time; derived from trades.
  • Live data graphs — real-time external feeds to assess value intraday. Caveat: a delay can exist vs the official verification source — outcomes are set by the source, not the live feed.

11.1 The API

Kalshi offers a REST API for your orders/trades/portfolio/history and public market data (all order books + stats). Public market-data endpoints need no authentication, at https://external-api.kalshi.com/trade-api/v2 (e.g. /series/{ticker}, /events, /markets?series_ticker=…, /markets/{ticker}/orderbook). Docs at docs.kalshi.com.

Sources: Price Graph · Forecast Graph · Live Data Graphs · Kalshi API · Quick Start: Market Data

12The trading-model layer

Interpretation built on the sourced facts above — the bridge from "how Kalshi works" to "how to build a model."

12.1 The fundamental edge equation

For a Yes taker buying at ask price a (dollars), with estimated true prob p̂:

  EV per contract = p̂ × ($1 − a) − (1 − p̂) × a − fee_per_contract
                  = p̂ − a − fee_per_contract
  where fee_per_contract uses the §6 formula on price a.

  • Trade Yes when  p̂ > a + fee   (underpriced)
  • Trade No  when  p̂ < bid_yes − fee   (overpriced; buy No at 1 − bid_yes)
  • No-trade band between thresholds = spread + fees
    (wider in illiquid / coin-flip markets)
Buy No (overpriced) no-trade band Buy Yes (underpriced) market price ± fees 100¢ your p̂
Trade only when your estimate clears the band. Buy Yes when p̂ > ask + fee; buy No when p̂ < bid − fee. The middle (spread + fees) is a dead zone — widest on illiquid, coin-flip markets.

12.2 Sizing

  • Capital-at-risk per contract = your cost (Yes: a; No: 1 − a), or with collateral return, the basket's max loss.
  • Consider fractional Kelly on the (p̂ − a) edge, heavily haircut — is uncertain and binary outcomes are high-variance. Never size as if were exact.

12.3 Strategy families (all supported by Kalshi mechanics)

StrategyMechanic relied onKey risk
Directional / valueprice = probability; your p̂ vs marketmodel error; resolution-source risk
Market makingpost limit orders, earn spread, fee-free makeradverse selection; inventory risk
Cross-strike / structural arbYes+No=100¢; mutually-exclusive sums; nested thresholdsthin liquidity; collateral lockups
Hedgingevent contract offsets external real-world riskbasis risk
Combo / correlationcombo = product of legscorrelation error; no-fill RFQ; finality

12.4 Structural arbitrage checks a model should run

  1. Yes/No coherence: if best_ask_yes + best_ask_no < 100¢ (net of fees), lock a profit.
  2. Mutually-exclusive sum: sum of all Yes prices across the group should ≈ 100¢. Persistent < 100¢ (buy all Yes) or > 100¢ (No all) flags an arb.
  3. Directional monotonicity: Yes price must be non-increasing as the threshold gets harder. A violation is an arb.

Always net out fees and check executable depth — apparent arbs often vanish after taker fees and slippage.

12.5 What the market price already "knows"

The market-implied probability bakes in the crowd's information, fees, and risk premia (hedgers overpay). You have edge only where you have better information, a better forecast, or you're providing a service (liquidity / risk-transfer) the crowd pays for. Be honest about which.

13Regulation & market integrity (deep dive)

Sourced to Kalshi's Market Integrity Hub (kalshi.com/market-integrity/*). Expands §1.3 with the statutes, rule cites, and protections — for tasks needing exact regulatory grounding.

13.1 The legal foundation

Prediction markets aren't new: early examples helped spur Congress to pass the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the federal statute governing commodities. The CEA covers swaps, futures, and Kalshi's main product, event contracts — which is why Kalshi is licensed and regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the U.S. commodities & derivatives regulator since 1974. The CFTC coordinates with the SEC, FTC, Treasury, and DOJ on oversight and enforcement.

13.2 What "DCM" actually obligates

Kalshi is regulated as a Designated Contract Market (DCM) — a CFTC-authorized marketplace for futures, swaps (incl. event contracts), and/or options. All trading is subject to the CEA plus 23 Core Principles (17 CFR Parts 38 & 39) that DCMs must adopt and enforce. The headline regulation categories:

RequirementWhat it forcesCite
Trading/market data publicationDaily publication of settlement prices, volume, open interest, opening/closing ranges → public visibility.17 CFR 38.450
Product certificationEach contract needs a narrative, supporting data, risk-management research, and evidence it follows the regs + Core Principles.17 CFR 38.4
Clearing obligationsClearing orgs must meet registration, anti-fraud, risk-management, settlement, system-safeguard, reporting & conflicts rules.17 CFR Part 39
Customer protectionsFair access; protection from fraudulent/unfair practices; proper fund handling. The NFA adds advertising restrictions + risk disclosure.17 CFR Part 38, Subpart M
Prohibited tradingBans manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and misstatements — full detail in §14.17 CFR 180.1
AML / screeningFCMs & IBs that onboard customers are Bank-Secrecy-Act institutions (CIP, SAR). Kalshi also runs its own AML/KYC.17 CFR 42.2
Commodity Exchange Act federal statute · 7 U.S.C. §7 CFTC — federal regulator U.S. regulator since 1974 + NFA: registration & ad rules Kalshi — DCM enforces 23 Core Principles (17 CFR Parts 38 & 39) Your funds → Kalshi Klear federally regulated clearinghouse risk-managed · anti-fraud trade data → CFTC daily
One chain of accountability sits behind every contract. Federal law (the CEA) empowers the CFTC, which licenses Kalshi as a Designated Contract Market bound by 23 Core Principles — and your cash sits at the federally regulated Kalshi Klear clearinghouse. This is why published prices, volume, and settlement can be trusted as clean model inputs.

13.3 Why it matters — the four benefits Kalshi cites

  • Transparency — mandated publication of trading/market data, rule-change notices, and public disciplinary notices.
  • Integrity — prohibitions on manipulative/deceptive/abusive trading + fair-and-orderly-market duties; universal KYC means Kalshi knows who trades and can detect fraud, laundering, manipulation, underage access, and insider trading.
  • Security — funds held at a federally regulated clearinghouse under the same framework as other federal derivatives exchanges, with risk-management and anti-fraud safeguards.
  • Trust — Kalshi submits trade data to the CFTC daily; the CFTC reviews it for manipulation/fraud, and Kalshi coordinates to avoid listing easily-manipulated markets.
Modeling — why a modeler should care This scaffolding is why you can treat Kalshi's published prices, volume, and open interest as clean, non-fabricated inputs, and why settlement follows the stated source rather than house discretion. It also constrains the universe of listed markets (§15) — don't build strategies around contract types the CEA bars.

Source: How are prediction markets regulated?

14Prohibited & unlawful trading

"Anyone claiming insider trading on prediction markets is legal is wrong." Federal law, CFTC regulations, and Kalshi's CFTC-approved exchange rules prohibit insider trading and other illicit trading by members.

14.1 Federal law & CFTC regulations

CFTC 17 CFR 38.152 prohibits manipulative or fraudulent activity on exchange, misstatements/omission of material facts, defrauding another user, and price manipulation. The CFTC and DOJ have for years pursued insider-trading enforcement on CFTC-regulated markets; penalties have included multi-million-dollar fines and criminal enforcement. Where investigations suggest criminal intent, prosecutors commonly use the federal wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 — punishable by up to 20 years in prison, a $250,000 fine, and other penalties.

14.2 Kalshi's exchange-rule definition of insider trading

The Kalshi Rulebook defines insider trading as trading by:

  1. Any person with access (or in a position to access) material non-public information before it's publicly available;
  2. Any employee or affiliate of a source agency for any contract;
  3. Any decision-maker (direct or indirect), or anyone with influence on the outcome of the underlying event.

Kalshi additionally prohibits any activity that is fraudulent, abusive, manipulative, or deceptive, or that operates as a fraud or deceit upon another person.

1 · Access to material non-public info 2 · Employee / affiliate of source agency 3 · Decision-maker / influences outcome any yes? yes PROHIBITED no tradable position all no OK to model public-info edge only
Three questions decide if a market is off-limits. If the user holds material non-public info, works for or with the resolution source, or can influence the outcome, there is no legal trade — surface the risk, don't optimize it. Legitimate edge comes from public information analyzed better.

14.3 How Kalshi detects & enforces

  • KYC at onboarding — every account submits identifying info before any trade; activity is linked to identity from the start (17 CFR 38.151–.159).
  • Surveillance — the Compliance team monitors internal flagging systems (patterns, timing, positions, market history), 24/7, across every open market, analyzing each position against price movement, volume, and public info in real time.
  • Third-party tooling — vendors including IC360 share alerts triggered on other sports-market platforms, warning Kalshi about activity live elsewhere.
  • Investigation flow — an uncleared flag → account frozen (funds locked) → Compliance + Legal review & interview → if reasonable evidence, a notice of charges → the user can settle or face Kalshi's Disciplinary Panel; outcomes are reported to the CFTC, with informal law-enforcement referrals where appropriate.
KYC at onboarding surveillance 24/7 internal + IC360 flag → account frozen investigation settle / Disc. Panel outcomes & settlements reported to the CFTC · law-enforcement referrals where appropriate
Every account is identified, watched, and accountable. KYC ties trades to a real identity; 24/7 surveillance (plus cross-platform IC360 alerts) flags anomalies, freezes the account, and routes to investigation, then settlement or a Disciplinary Panel — all reported to the CFTC.
Modeling — HARD GUARDRAIL Screen the user against the 3-prong insider test for each market: do they work at / affiliate with the source agency, can they influence the outcome, or do they hold MNPI? If yes, there is no tradable position — surface the legal risk and stop, don't optimize. Never design strategies resembling wash trading, spoofing, or coordinated manipulation; they're surveilled in real time and illegal. Legitimate "better information" (§12.5) means public info analyzed better — never non-public information.

Source: Prohibited and Unlawful Trading Activity

15Regulated vs. unregulated prediction markets

Onshore, CFTC-regulated markets (Kalshi) and offshore, unregulated markets differ profoundly despite surface similarity. Know which you're modeling — their data integrity and contract universe are not comparable.

TopicRegulated (Kalshi)Unregulated (offshore)
Government oversightYes — CFTC-licensed, enforces complianceNo — not licensed anywhere
Know-Your-CustomerYes — required to know all usersNo — anonymous (blockchain-only)
Trading restrictions enforcedYes — must prevent illicit activityNo — no KYC, can't detect it
Onboarding screeningYes — screens certain categoriesNo — identities unknown
AML complianceYes — CFTC + bank requirementsNo — no KYC
Insider / manipulation rulesYes — must preventNo — can't detect
Customer protectionsYes — CFTC/FTC regs, NFA rules, federal & state lawNo — no legal oversight
Prohibited marketsYes — CEA + CFTC oversightNo — can list war, assassinations, terrorism
Onshore · Regulated (Kalshi) Offshore · Unregulated KYC — every user identified anonymous (blockchain only) 24/7 surveillance + IC360 no monitoring customer protections (CFTC / NFA) none legal recourse none CEA bars war / assassination / terror lists prohibited contracts
Same surface, opposite substance. A CFTC-regulated venue identifies users, surveils trading, protects customers, offers recourse, and is barred from war/assassination/terror contracts. Offshore venues do none of this — so an offshore quote is not a clean fair-value benchmark for the "same" event.
  • Licensing barrier — under 7 U.S.C. § 7, a U.S. prediction market must obtain a DCM license (hundreds of regs, 23 Core Principles, CFTC-approved rules). Offshore markets skip all of it.
  • User identification — CFTC rules (17 CFR 38.153) require identifying each user; offshore venues often collect none → anonymous trading, weak policing, defrauded users.
  • Illicit-activity magnet — research indicates offshore venues are targeted by wash trading (opposite sides of the same market to manipulate price — illegal here) and offshore insider trading U.S. rules would bar.
  • Prohibited contracts — the CEA (17 CFR 40.11) lets the CFTC reject contracts on assassinations, war, or terrorism; offshore venues face no such limits.
Modeling — implication Cross-venue price comparisons (Kalshi vs. an offshore book on the "same" event) are not clean arbitrage signals: the offshore price may embed wash-trading/manipulation, resolution rules may differ, and you have no recourse offshore. Treat Kalshi's regulated price as the higher-integrity input; never assume an offshore quote is fair value.

Source: Regulated vs. Unregulated Prediction Markets

16Prediction Markets 101 — risk & strategy discipline

Kalshi's own primer. Much overlaps §12, but it pins three things: the "trade like a business" framing, the fully-collateralized mechanic, and a sharp rules-nuance example.

16.1 Treat trading like a business model

Before trading, answer: Which markets, and why? How much can I responsibly risk? When do I trade? What do I do when trades go well / poorly? When do I close, pause, or stop? These define your information edge, profit/exit goals, comfortable capital, financial strategy, and plans for both profits and losses.

16.2 Read BOTH rule sets (the highest-impact habit)

Each market has two rule sets: Market Rules (the short version, beneath the price display) and Contract Rules (the full linked PDF).

Kalshi's worked nuance A market on whether the President will say "immigrant" in his next press conference might resolve Yes on the plural "immigrants" but No on a related word like "immigration." Settlement hinges on this wording — review both rule sets first (reinforces invariant I6 and §7.4 source risk).
The word the President says in the next press conference "immigrant" "immigrants" "immigration" YES YES NO
Settlement turns on the exact words. Kalshi's own example: "immigrant" and the plural "immigrants" resolve Yes, but the related word "immigration" resolves No. Read both the Market Rules and the full Contract Rules before modeling — wording, not vibe, decides the payout.

16.3 Market risk & price behavior

  • The outcome can't be known in advance → unexpected losses are possible. A change in an event's likelihood may not move the contract price, blocking a profitable exit or a loss-cut.
  • Event-contract prices depend on expected probability, which makes traditional derivative-pricing models inapplicable. Moves are often driven by news / new information and can be sudden.

16.4 Fully collateralized — and timing matters

  • All trades are fully collateralized: you deposit the full max-loss up front, and it stays locked for the duration you hold the position — this is your capital-at-risk (see §8, §12.2).
  • Resolution timelines vary (a Fed announcement next week vs. a "by year-end" market) — factor holding period into strategy.
  • Spreads widen as the outcome gets more certain, making a losing position harder to exit. Watch volume and spreads (see §5).

16.5 Position sizing discipline

  • The goal isn't to win every trade — every trader loses many; aim for more wins than losses and control loss size.
  • Always decide how much you're willing to lose and your next step if you do.
  • Don't deploy all capital on one trade — spread it; consider starting small and scaling as a working strategy emerges.
Modeling — tie-back §16 is Kalshi's plain-language version of §12's math: "information edge" = p̂ independent of price; "spreads widen as certainty develops" = the fee/spread no-trade band plus thinning depth near resolution; "fully collateralized" = capital-at-risk is real locked cash, so rank by ROI-per-dollar (§8), not EV alone.

Source: Prediction Markets 101

17Glossary (Kalshi terms of art)

Event contractBinary contract paying $1 if the event happens, $0 if not.
Yes / No contractThe two sides of a market; Yes + No = 100¢.
StrikeA specific threshold/market within an event.
Cents (¢) pricingPrices 1–99¢; price ≈ implied probability × 100.
Series / Event / MarketRecurring template / one instance / one binary contract.
Category / Subcategory (tags)Discovery groupings above series.
Order bookAll resting orders with price & quantity.
Resting orderA not-yet-matched order on the book.
Bid / Ask (offer)Max a buyer will pay / min a seller will accept.
SpreadAsk − Bid.
Maker / TakerPosts liquidity (resting) / removes liquidity (immediate).
Quick / Market orderImmediate fill at best price (walks the book).
Limit orderFills at your price or better; rests if unfilled.
Flip sellingSell more than held by flipping to the opposite side.
Block tradeLarge privately-negotiated trade (ECPs; ≥25,000 contracts).
FillAn executed (matched) order.
Settlement / DeterminationFinalizing outcome & paying winners / confirming the official result.
Outcome verification sourceThe agency/data that decides the outcome (in the rules).
Scalar settlementResolution to a value between $0 and $1.
Combo / RFQMulti-leg position = product of legs (max $1); priced via Request For Quote.
Collateral return (netting_enabled)Early cash-back on hedged positions; reduces capital-at-risk.
Mutually exclusive / Directional groupOnly one Yes possible / nested thresholds with logical implication.
Open interest / Volume / LiquidityOutstanding contracts / contracts traded / dollar depth on the book.
Cash / Portfolio valueWithdrawable balance / cash + market value of open positions.
Kalshi Klear / DCM / CFTC / ECP / APYIn-house clearinghouse / Designated Contract Market / federal regulator / Eligible Contract Participant / interest on idle balances.
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)Federal statute governing swaps/futures/event contracts; basis for CFTC authority (7 U.S.C. § 7).
Core PrinciplesThe 23 standards (17 CFR Parts 38 & 39) a DCM must adopt & enforce.
Market Rules vs Contract RulesShort rule summary on the price page vs the full linked PDF; settlement turns on the exact wording.
Fully collateralizedYou deposit the full max-loss up front; funds stay locked for the position's duration.
Insider trading (Kalshi 3-prong)Trading on MNPI / by a source-agency employee or affiliate / by an outcome decision-maker or influencer — prohibited.
MNPIMaterial non-public information.
Wash tradingTaking opposite sides of the same market to manipulate price — illegal (a known offshore problem).
Wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343)Federal statute used to criminally charge fraud schemes; up to 20 yrs.
NFANational Futures Association — oversees ongoing registration; imposes marketing/advertising rules.
FCM / IBFutures Commission Merchant / Introducing Broker — CFTC-licensed entities that onboard customers (BSA/AML-bound).
KYC / AMLKnow-Your-Customer / Anti-Money-Laundering programs (required of regulated venues).
IC360Third-party surveillance vendor; shares cross-platform sports-market alerts with Kalshi.
Disciplinary PanelKalshi's body that hears charges if a flagged user doesn't settle.

18Common modeling pitfalls

  1. Treating market price as truth. It's fee/spread-laden and crowd-biased — your p̂ must be independent.
  2. Ignoring the fee parabola. Breakeven edge is largest at 50¢; many coin-flip "edges" don't survive fees.
  3. Pricing off top-of-book. Real fills walk the book; model slippage from depth.
  4. Forgetting the reciprocal book. Yes ask = 100 − No bid; the API returns bids only.
  5. Assuming combo legs are independent. Same-game legs are correlated; the product overstates "all-happen."
  6. Underweighting resolution-source risk. Exact source/definition/timestamp can flip a "sure" market.
  7. Confusing close vs determination time. A market open after the event ≠ outcome undecided.
  8. EV without capital-at-risk / collateral return. ROI-per-dollar, not just EV, ranks strategies.
  9. Counting Yes and No as separate exposures. Buying Yes ≡ selling No — one position.
  10. Assuming binary settlement always. Scalar / DNP markets settle fractionally.
  11. Modeling a trade the user is legally barred from. If the user is an insider on the resolution source or can influence the outcome, there is no tradable "edge" — only a bannable, potentially criminal act. Flag it (§14).

19Papers & further reading

The theory behind the mechanics, with direct PDFs. Start with the two Kalshi-specific papers.

Most directly relevant to Kalshi

Foundations — price-as-probability and its limits

Sizing math — Kelly

Arbitrage & AMM pricing

Practitioner whitepapers

Official Kalshi docs — Fee Schedule PDF, API docs, and the LLM index: see the Source index (§20).

20Source index